

BY WILLIAM EMMETTE COLEMAN.

I say with John Stuart Mill, "If in ascribing goodness to God I do not mean what I mean by goodness to do not mean a goodness of which we have no knowledge, but an unexpressed and therefore inexpressible and incomprehensible goodness, which for nothing I know may be a totally different quality from that which I and venerate--what do I mean by calling it goodness and what reason have I for venerating it?" To call God good, if it means anything, is to kind of say, "man's goodness, what is it but saying, with its slight change of phraseology, that God--may possibly not good." I say with Mill, "I will call no being good if it is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to fellow-creatures." I hold further with Prof. Huxley

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business authorities in science in this country will consider
being based upon strict scientific principles. A general knowl-
edge of the subject is necessary to the public, and it is the
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in the flesh, then will the fascination flow.

ing from the heart and the sacred recollections of the past, vanish, it seems to us, to a great extent if not entirely; and the pursuit of this phase will be, among intelligent people at least, from a purely intellectual standpoint.

The Existence of Evil.

In our recent reply to some remarks by Prof. Underwood, we put the question, "How do I know that either death or suffering is an absolute and unrecompensed evil to the brute or to the human being?" This inquiry Prof. Underwood answers, first, by presenting in the most convincing

form the evidences of evil in the world (which nobody denies), and then by concluding that, "a being having the power would prevent suffering if he were good."

What is this but a mere begging of the question, tantamount to an admission that we really do not know, and cannot assert; that death or suffering is an unrequited evil; and since we cannot say it? what point

vent the evil, if He were good? So, reasoning in the same way, we might say, if God were good, he would not have allowed any finite, imperfect being to exist; all should have been Gods down to the worm and mosquito. To higher intelligences, it may seem

quite as childish to ask *Why* evil exists, as to ask *Why* has a triangle three sides? Evil is a necessary accompaniment of finite-

We remarked, "In order to say that God's permission of evil is a proof either of im-

For this opinion, Prof. Underwood throws
at our head the well-worn quotation from
John Stuart Mill: "If in ascribing goodness

to God, I did not mean the goodness of which I have some knowledge, etc." This serves very well for what Mill intended it, namely, as an answer to those theological dogmas which ascribe cruelty and obvious injustice to Deity, as in the orthodox plan of "salva-

The point is: Are they unrecompensed evils? If to this is replied: "God, if all-wise and all-powerful, would permit no suffering or evil, even if it were most amply

good." Then we re-assert that, since there can be no good without evil, no progress without defect, no freedom without wrong as well as right, the reply is again a mere begging of the question, and our assertion stands unconfuted: "In order to say that God's permission of 'evil' is a proof either

Professor Underwood reiterates his objection as to the millions of germs and eggs that perish without development; an objection much emphasized by Strauss.

We never doubt that the case is a very hard one. The eggs and germs, so far as we can learn, have never troubled themselves about their non-development; and why should we give them our pity? To our suggestion that these eggs and germs may, in fact, be in the mysterious complex of life and "material activity" going on about us, all be lost, the Professor asks: "In sober earnestness, is this anything more than a mere supposition?" To which, with equal sobriety and earnestness, we might reply: "Is there of it anything more than mere supposition?"

Materialism Again Answered.

In reply to the *London Spiritualist*

Physical science—the ordering of phenomena and their laws—is not materialism, and neither is physics. It may, for all its own purposes, perhaps, quite reasonably decline to entertain questions of philosophy. But he has not chosen to do so, and in so doing he has made his own science become a metaphysician, or involve himself in confusions and contradictions which will not be high wisdom to result from ignorance of their science.

Mr. Atkinson finds fault with me for speaking of the matter of materialists as if they were a sect. He understands, he says, that I define it as an "active cause, source, or principle, of all phenomena or effects."

Mr. Underwood tells us that "material activity is involved in the very conception of matter." Surely Mr. Atkinson (Mr. Underwood also has persuaded himself that there is nothing in the notion of materialism in such a definition as this. Is it not very evidently an abstraction barren of consequences, and resorted to under stress of the Idealist argument?) in Lange's *History of Materialism*, on the other hand (a book thoroughly recommended by, and translated into English at the instance of, Professor Huxley), the distinctive character of the materialistic system is said to involve these propositions: "The purely material nature of matter, the origination of all phenomena, including those

What becomes of Mr. Underwood's independent "material activity" after this? If the matter is purely material whence comes the activity or the "pre-existent conditions," that ultimate life, mind, consciousness? To say that matter and motion do it all, independent of any potency or spiritual activity in matter, is simply to make either matter or motion divine, or to say what no

